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Abstract This paper provides an account of imperatives accompanied by rising
intonation, formalized within the Table model. It argues that rising imperatives are
conventionally weak, lacking speaker commitment.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides an account of imperatives accompanied by steeply, monotoni-
cally rising intonation (the L* H-H% tune). I propose an account of such sentences
that derives their discourse effect compositionally from the discourse effect of ut-
terances of imperatives and the discourse effect of the L* H-H% tune. The account
is formalized within an extension of the Table model (Farkas & Bruce 2010), and
makes use of an independently-motivated proposal for the meaning of the L* H-H%
tune: that it calls off speaker commitment (Truckenbrodt 2006).
The structure of this paper is as follows. §2 presents the empirical facts; §3
argues that rising imperatives are indeed (morpho-syntactic) imperatives; §4 argues
that the empirical facts pose problems for prior accounts of imperatives; and §5
contains the positive proposal, including the development of an extension of the
Table model to utterances of imperatives.
2 The empirical facts
This section surveys the essential data about the behavior of rising imperatives,
much of which is novel. Imperatives accompanied by the L* H-H% tune have
not been widely discussed discussed in prior literature (though see Bolinger 1989;
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Condoravdi, Amy Rose Deal, Ashwini Deo, Donka Farkas, Sunwoo Jeong, Magda Kaufmann, Man-
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Portner 2018a; Keough, McClay, Babel &Matthewson 2016). However, (what look
like) rising imperatives are quite common in casual speech:1
(1) Buy me a drink?
(2) Let’s go?
(3) Give me a ride home?
I’ll return in §3 to the question of whether or not these are genuine imperatives
(I’ll argue that they are), but first I’d like to establish a couple of empirical facts
about these apparent rising imperatives. One intuition (following Portner 2018a) is
that rising imperatives sound much more tentative/suggestiony than falling impera-
tives.
(4) A: I really like this present grandma gave me.
a. B:Write her a thank-you note.
b. B:Write her a thank-you note?
Impressionistically speaking, in (4a) B seems to be instructing A to write her
grandmother a thank-you note, whereas in (4b) B seems to be only pointing out a
course of action relevant to A’s comment. B’s utterance here seems fairly similar
to an utterance of You could write her a thank-you note. To put it in a slightly more
theory-laden way, in (4a) B seems to have committed to the idea that that’s what A
should do, but in (4b) B seems to be leaving it up to A to decide whether that’s what
she should do.
I’d like to put some empirical teeth on the intuition that rising imperatives are
in some sense weaker than falling imperatives. I’ll do this in two ways. First, I’ll
discuss the possibility for the rejection of an imperative to be followed up on by I
insist. Then I’ll move on to discuss sequences of contradictory imperatives.
2.1 I insist
That some imperatives feel weaker than others is an old observation—in addition to
imperatives that seem to give commands or instructions, there are also imperatives
that (irrespective of intonation) are felt to be more like offers, like Have a cookie
(Schmerling 1982 a.o.). In this section I’ll argue that rising imperatives are not the
same thing as weak uses of falling imperatives. Observe the following.
1 Throughout, example sentences punctuated with a question mark are to be read as accompanied by
the L* H-H% tune (a steeply, monotonically rising intonational contour), and example sentences
punctures with a period are to be read as accompanied by the H* L-L% tune (a steeply, monotoni-
cally falling intonational contour).
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(5) A: Have a cookie.
B: No, thanks.
A: I insist.
Even for a use of a falling imperative that is typically taken to be illocutionarily
‘weak,’ like an offer, the speaker can respond to the addressee’s rejection of the
imperative with I insist. However, if the original imperative is uttered with rising
intonation, following up with I insist becomes significantly degraded.
(6) A: Have a cookie?
B: No, thanks.
A: ??I insist.
Consider also sequences in which I insist directly follows the imperative:
(7) Have a cookie. I insist.
(8) #Have a cookie? I insist.
While ‘weak’ uses of falling imperatives can be insisted upon, rising imper-
atives cannot. This suggests that not all ‘weak’ imperative are created equal—
whatever leads to the weakness of rising imperatives is not the same thing that
leads to the weakness of ‘offering’ uses of falling imperatives. We might suppose
that ‘weak’ uses of falling imperatives, like offers, are merely pragmatically weak
(e.g. Farkas 2011). I will argue that rising imperatives are conventionally weak.
2.2 Contradictory sequences
Intonation affects whether a sequence of imperatives is contradictory or not:
(9) A: I’m having trouble managing my time lately. I don’t know what my plans
should be for this evening, do you have any advice?
a. B:Work on your paper? Blow it off and go to the beach?
b. B:Work on your paper. #Blow it off and go to the beach.
Example (9) displays a crucial asymmetry. In (9b), the speaker contradicts her-
self, instructing the addressee to pursue mutually incompatible courses of action.2
However, as (9a) shows, a normally-contradictory sequence of imperatives can be-
come felicitous if each imperative is accompanied by the L* H-H% tune. In other
words, rising intonation is able to render a sequence of ordinarily-contradictory im-
peratives non-contradictory. I will argue that this is explained by the conventional
weakness of rising imperatives.
2 Note again that the sentence-final period in these examples should be taken as signifying that the ut-
terance is accompanied by a steep, monotonic fall (the H* L-L% tune). There are non-monotonically
falling tunes that nonetheless end in a final fall with which examples like this can be made felicitous.
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3 Rising imperatives are imperatives
In English, imperatives are morphologically indistinguishable from infinitive VPs.3
Because English has no special imperative verbforms, it is difficult to prove con-
clusively that a given sentence is a (morphosyntactic) imperative. In this section, I
argue that the phenomena at issue are indeed best analyzed as rising imperatives. I
argue that apparent rising imperatives in English cannot be reduced to either of the
non-imperative sentence types they most resemble: fragment answers, or questions
that have undergone left-edge ellipsis.
3.1 Rising imperatives vs fragment answers
One potential analysis of some apparent rising imperatives in English is that they are
fragment answers (Merchant 2004; Stainton 2005). This analysis could be applied
to data in which an apparent rising imperative is used to reply to a question:
(10) A:What should I read tonight?
B: A novel?
(11) A:What should I do tonight?
B: Read a novel?
In (10), A’s question seeks an answer that can be provided by a DP, and a DP
fragment is an appropriate response. Likewise, in (11), A’s question seeks an an-
swer that can be provided by a VP, and a VP fragment is an appropriate response.
Why should we think that B’s response in (11) is anything other than B’s response
in (10): a fragment answer? If apparent rising imperatives in English are just frag-
ment VPs, then accounting for them reduces to accounting for rising intonation on
fragment answers.
There are empirical ways that we can tell fragment answers apart from impera-
tives. Negation in imperatives behaves in a particular way:
(12) a. Don’t text him back anymore.
b. * Not text him back anymore.
Negated imperatives require contraction with do; bare negation is never al-
lowed. But both kinds of negation are fine in fragment answers:
3 In some cases, English imperatives have more going on than infinitive VPs—for instance negated
imperatives, in which do-support occurs (1), and imperatives with overt subjects (2):
(i) Don’t stay out too late.
(ii) Everyone be quiet.
However, even in these cases, the verb shows up in its infinitive form.
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(13) A: I keep telling the guy who I broke up with that I’m not interested in
talking to him, but he won’t stop texting me. What should I do?
a. B: Don’t text him back anymore?
b. B: Not text him back anymore?
In this case, A’s question licenses fragment answers of the appropriate size; we
can tell that that (13b) is a fragment answer, because it’s not a possible imperative.
So we might assume that (13a) is a fragment answer as well, since (13b) demon-
strates that the question licenses fragment answers of the appropriate size.
The grammaticality of (13b) is a test for whether the context that licenses frag-
ments of the relevant kind. If imperative-sized fragment answers are possible, (13b)
should be appropriate. Not all questions license imperative-sized fragment answers,
and if we alter the context so that it no longer licenses fragment answers, rising im-
peratives are still possible:
(14) A: I keep telling the guy who I broke up with that I’m not interested in
talking to him, but he won’t stop texting me. Do you have any advice?
a. B: Don’t text him back anymore?
b. B: *Not text him back anymore?
Rising imperatives are possible in contexts where imperative-sized fragment
answers aren’t. Therefore, apparent rising imperatives in English can’t be reduced
to fragment answers. The upshot: when an apparent rising imperative is given in
response to a question, we must control the question to make sure that it doesn’t
license imperative-sized fragment answers. I’ve done so throughout this paper.
3.2 Rising imperatives vs left-edge ellipsis
Apparent rising imperatives in English resemble questions that have undergone el-
lipsis at their left edge (Zwicky & Pullum 1983; Fitzpatrick 2006; Weir 2012). Con-
sider the following examples, due to Fitzpatrick (2006):
(15) <Does> anybody want a hot dog?
(16) <Has> anyone seen John today?
(17) <Is> anybody going to the game?
(18) <Do> you want chicken or beef?
I’ll call these instances of ‘left-edge ellipsis,’ following Weir (2016). Many
apparent rising imperatives in English admit of intuitively plausible paraphrases
with questions:
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(19) Buy me a drink? ≈ Do you want to buy me a drink?
We might think, then, that some apparent rising imperatives are derived from
questions via left-edge ellipsis, like so:
(20) <Do you want to> buy me a drink?
Such an account would need to explain why so much more is elided here than
in normal cases of left-edge ellipsis, which as seen above and below generally elide
only something very small, like an auxiliary and/or a pronominal subject. I argue
that irrespective of this concern, a left-edge ellipsis account of apparent rising im-
peratives in English is not tenable. I’ll give two arguments.
First, left-edge ellipsis is prosodically licensed, and is only possible at the left
edge of an intonational phrase. The following examples come from Weir (2016).
(21) a. (Have you) seen the new Star Wars?
b. I’m asking you whether *(you have) seen the new Star Wars.
(22) a. (I) won’t bother seeing it, I think.
b. I think *(I) won’t bother seeing it.
Rising imperatives do not display this pattern. Material is allowed to intervene
between the ‘missing’ subject and the left edge of an intonational phrase:
(23) A: I’m having trouble managing my time lately. I don’t know what my plans
should be for this evening, do you have any advice?
B:Maybe work on your paper?
My second argument that apparent rising imperatives cannot be reduced to cases
of left-edge ellipsis is that it’s difficult to see how an ellipsis account could deal with
negated rising imperatives:
(24) Don’t text him back anymore?
It is difficult indeed to see how this could be derived via left-edge ellipsis from
a question. Don’t should be sitting in C, to the left of the putatively elided subject.
As left-edge ellipsis is a process that gets rid of material on the left edge of the
sentence, there is no way to left-edge elide the subject without also eliding don’t.
4 Problems for prior accounts
In this section, I discuss the ramifications of the empirical observations above for
various prior proposals for the semantics of imperatives. I show that accounting for
rising imperatives is a non-trivial problem for prior accounts.4
4 In §5, I attempt to derive the behavior of rising imperatives from a previously proposed account
of the contribution of the L* H-H% tune to the meaning of utterances of declarative sentences
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4.1 Portner (2018a)
Portner (2018a) provides the only formal account of rising imperatives of which I
am aware. Portner builds an extension of the ‘to-do list’ system in Portner 2004
(inspired by Gunlogson 2001 and Farkas & Bruce 2010) in which each interlocutor
has their own individual copy of each other’s to-do lists. When a falling imperative
is uttered, the speaker adds the property it denotes to their own version of the ad-
dressee’s to-do list thereby, and simultaneously proposes that the addressee add it
to their own version of their to-do list as well, which would give rise to a shared un-
derstanding among the interlocutors that the addressee is to take action to make the
indicated property true of themself. A rising imperative adds a property to the ad-
dressee’s version of the addressee’s to-do list, while making the same proposal that
the interlocutors come to a shared understanding of the content of the addressee’s
to-do list.
Portner describes the effects his theory predicts for falling and rising impera-
tives like so: In uttering a falling imperative, the speaker communicates that she
“rates futures in which the addressee [obeys the imperative] higher than those in
which he does not, and creates an expectation that this judgment will become
mutual” (1b). In uttering a rising imperative, the speaker communicates that she
“thinks the addressee rates futures in which the addressee [obeys the imperative]
higher than those in which he does not, and creates an expectation that this judg-
ment will become mutual” (2b). To paraphrase extremely simply: on Portner’s
view, a falling imperative indicates that the speaker wants the addressee to act in a
certain way, and a rising imperative indicates that the speaker thinks the addressee
wants to act in a certain way. In both cases, the speaker intends to create a common
understanding that for the addressee to act in that way would be preferable.
I believe Portner’s proposal to be unable to capture the empirical facts discussed
above irrespective of whether or not one shares the intuition that rising imperatives
signal the speaker’s expectations of what the addressee wants to do. Portner’s ac-
count is incapable of capturing the crucial asymmetry in (9): that sequences of im-
peratives that are contradictory with steep, monotonic falls become felicitous with
steep, monotonic rises.
On Portner’s view, a sequence of falling imperatives and a sequence of rising
imperatives do the same thing, formally speaking: they perform a sequence of up-
dates to a to-do list, adding multiple properties to it one after another. The only
difference, for Portner, is whether the to-do list being updated is the speaker’s ver-
(Truckenbrodt 2006; Rudin 2018). As such, I will restrict my comments to theories that provide an
explicit account of rising imperatives, or that treat imperatives as updating the discourse context in
the same way that declaratives sentences do. Other theories (e.g. Charlow 2014 and Starr 2017) go
undiscussed for reasons of space.
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sion or the addressee’s version. As the contradictoriness of the sequence of falling
imperatives in (9) shows us, some sequences of updates to a to-do list are incoher-
ent: a coherent to-do list cannot contain two properties that cannot both be made
true of the holder of the to-do list. It shouldn’t matter whether the to-do list is the
speaker’s version or the addressee’s version: in the falling imperative sequence,
on Portner’s view, the speaker has expressed contradictory preferences about what
course of action the addressee should take, and created the expectation that those
contradictory preferences will become shared preferences. In the rising impera-
tive sequence, something nearly identical has happened: the speaker has expressed
contradictory expectations about what the addressee’s preferences are, and again
created the expectation that those contradictory preferences will become shared
preferences. On any view in which rising imperatives comprise to-do list updates,
sequences of mutually incompatible rising imperatives should be infelicitous for the
same reason sequences of mutually incompatible falling imperatives are; the facts
show just the opposite.
4.2 Kaufmann (2012a, 2016)
On Kaufmann’s account, imperatives contain a covert strong priority modal, and are
identical to declarative priority modalized sentences except that the covert modal
carries a presupposition that ensures that it is interpreted performatively. In other
words, on Kaufmann’s view:
(25) ⟦Go to the store⟧ ≈ ⟦I hereby decree that you must go to the store⟧
However, rising imperatives clearly are not the same as performatively-interpreted
must-claims: they do not create obligations in the same way as falling imperatives.
So at the very least, if Kaufmann’s theory is to be able to deal with rising imper-
atives, it must be that rising intonation somehow calls off the relevant presupposi-
tions. Let’s assume for a moment that this is so. Even if there were a mechanism that
called off Kaufmann’s presuppositions, we’d still be left with the core semantics of
her proposal: a covert strong priority modal. But declarative sentences with overt
strong priority modals, which should have the same semantics as a presupposition-
cancelled imperative on Kaufmann’s account, simply do not interact with rising
intonation in the same way that imperatives do:
(26) a. Work on your paper? Blow it off and go to the beach?
b. #You {must, have to, need to} work on your paper? You {must, have to,
need to} blow it off and go to the beach?
One might retreat slightly, and say that imperatives contain covert weak ne-
cessity modals, like should, not strong necessity modals, like must (see Kaufmann
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2012b for arguments both for and against treating imperative modality as weak ne-
cessity). However, the paraphrase is still not right:
(27) a. Work on your paper? Blow it off and go to the beach?
b. ??You should work on your paper? You should blow it off and go to the
beach?
It’s clear that (27b) does not mean the same thing as (27a). The former asks
the addressee to entertain the possibility that what they should do is work on their
paper and the possibility that what they should do is blow it off and go to the beach.
The latter asks the addressee to consider that they could work on their paper, and
that they could blow it off and go to the beach.
That Kaufmann’s proposal reduces the meaning of imperatives to the meaning
of a particular use of modalized declaratives is a design feature of her account—she
takes it to be desirable for imperatives to be of the same semantic type as declara-
tives, and to interact with the same contextual components in the same ways. How-
ever, the declarative paraphrases that seem sensible for canonical uses of impera-
tives do not interact with rising intonation in the same way that the actual impera-
tives do, suggesting that Kaufmann’s story is not the full story.
4.3 Condoravdi & Lauer (2012, 2017)
Condoravdi & Lauer’s account also has the property that imperative sentences are of
the same semantic type as declarative sentences, and interact with the context in the
same way. Condoravdi & Lauer (2017) take imperatives to denote the proposition
p that the speaker has a public effective preference for some proposition q. An
effective preference is a preference that is used for rational action choice, and as
such is subject to requirements of consistency and realism.5
Because Condoravdi & Lauer give an account of imperatives in which they
interact with the context in the same way as declaratives, we might expect imper-
atives to interact with intonation in the same way as their declarative paraphrases.
On Condoravdi & Lauer’s account, imperatives are speaker preferential attitudes of
a particular kind:
(28) ⟦Leave⟧ ≈ ⟦I want you to leave⟧
Where want is interpreted in terms of effective preferences
But again, what we see empirically is that overt speaker preferential attitudes
don’t interact with intonation in the same way that imperatives do:
5 See Condoravdi & Lauer 2016 §5 for the formal details.
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(29) a. Work on your paper? Blow it off and go to the beach?
b. #I want you to work on your paper? I want you to blow it off and go to
the beach?
That overt speaker preferential attitudes do not interact with intonation in a
way that is congruent with imperatives is problematic for the idea that imperatives
simply denote speaker preferential attitudes, and otherwise interact with the context
in the same way that speaker preferential attitudes do.
5 Proposal
I’ll give an account of rising imperatives that seeks to explain their behavior compo-
sitionally, in terms of the contribution of the imperative clause type to the meaning
of an utterance, and the contribution of the L* H-H% tune. I assume, building on
prior work, that L* H-H% signals that the speaker is making no discourse commit-
ments by virtue of their utterance (Truckenbrodt 2006), and I follow Rudin (2018)
in formalizing that analysis within the Table model (Farkas & Bruce 2010), which
allows for a particularly explicit account of how two discourse moves can differ only
in terms of speaker commitment. I’ll briefly give background on the Table model
in §5.1, and extend that model to imperatives in §5.2. In §5.3, I give a pragmatics
for rising imperatives, and in §5.4 and §5.5 I show how the proposal accounts for
the data.
5.1 Background: Farkas & Bruce (2010)
Farkas & Bruce’s Table model is in effect an elaboration of Stalnaker (1978), which
models how assertions are used to build Common Ground. The Table model intro-
duces a proposal step to assertions, in which a speaker takes on a public discourse
commitment and projects a future Common Ground.6 The model has the following
five components:
(30) BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE Farkas & Bruce (2010) MODEL:
a. COMMON GROUND (CG)
The set of all propositions that all discourse participants are publicly com-
mitted to
b. CONTEXT SET (CS)
The set of all worlds that are compatible with all propositions in the Com-
mon Ground (= ⋂CG)
6 This model also provides a unified account of responses to assertions and questions; I ignore this
aspect of the proposal here.
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c. DISCOURSE COMMITMENTS
For all discourse participants X , there is a set DCX of propositions X has
publicly committed to
d. THE TABLE (T )
A push-down stack of Issues (sets of propositions), the uppermost element
of which (MAX(T )) is currently at issue
e. PROJECTED SET (PS)
The set of all Common Grounds that could result by adding an element of
MAX(T ) to the current CG
I assume that in addition to these components, a discourse context contains a
set A of discourse participants, and a Question Under Discussion (QUD).7
(31) DISCOURSE CONTEXTS
A context cn is a tuple ⟨An;DCn;Tn;CGn;CSn;PSn;QUDn⟩
Where An is a set of individuals,
DCn is a set of sets of discourse commitments DCa;n, one for each a ∈ An
Tn is a Table,
CGn, CSn, and PSn are a Common Ground, a Context Set, and a Projected
Set, such that CSn = ⋂CGn and PSn = {CGn+ p : p ∈ MAX(T)},
and QUDn is a contextually salient question
An assertion of a sentence denoting a proposition p is a function of the following
form:
(32) ASSERT(s;sp;cn) → cn+1, such that (cf. Farkas & Bruce’s ex. 9)
i. DCsp;n+1 = DCsp;n+ p
ii. Tn+1 = Tn+{p}
iii. PSn+1 = {CGn+1+ p}
iv. in all other respects, cn+1 = cn
The speaker makes a discourse commitment to p, and the Issue {p} is placed
on the Table, making p at issue and projecting a Common Ground including p.
All components of the Table model are modally unified: they are to be inter-
preted DOXASTICALLY. A speaker’s discourse commitments are propositions that
they are presenting themselves as though they believe. The Common Ground is a
set of propositions that all interlocutors are doxastically committed to for the pur-
poses of the conversation. The propositions in the maximal element of the Table are
7 Farkas & Bruce (2010) intend the Table to serve the purpose of the QUD as developed by Roberts
(1996), but also intend it to legislate what content is currently at issue, and to provide antecedents
for elliptical response particles. For an argument that those purposes should be kept separate from
the QUD see Rudin (2018) §1.2.4.
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those propositions currently under consideration as potential mutual doxastic com-
mitments, and the Projected Set shows what it would look like if those potential mu-
tual doxastic commitments were made. Finally, the QUD structures doxastically-
oriented inquiry: which of these propositions should we believe is true?8
5.2 Extending the model to imperatives
I propose a programmatic extension of the Table model that bifurcates it into dox-
astic and teleological halves, identical to each other except in terms of the modal
interpretation of their components. The doxastic half of the model is identical to the
standard Table model. I propose that utterances of imperatives do exactly the same
thing that standard assertions do, except that they interact with the teleological half
of the model, not the doxastic half.9 For the sake of concreteness I will assume, fol-
lowing Condoravdi & Lauer (2012), that the modality relevant to the teleological
half of the context is effective preferences.10
(33) DISCOURSE COMMITMENTS (bifurcated version):
For all discourse participants X , DCX = ⟨DCdox;X ;DCtel;X⟩
WhereDCdox;X is a set of propositions that X is publicly committed to acting
as though she believes,
and DCtel;X is a set of propositions that X is publicly committed to acting as
though she has an effective preference for
Teleological Discourse Commitments (DCtel) correspond to Condoravdi & Lauer’s
(2012, 2017) Public Effective Preferences. Effective preferences are used to guide
action choice, so they are required to be consistent and realistic. The consistency
requirement, simply stated, is that the grand intersection of any agent’s DCtel must
not be the empty set. We could state the condition on realism like so:
(34) REALISM CONDITION ON DCtel:
For any agent X , [∀p ∶ p ∈DCtel;X]p∩⋂DCdox;X ≠∅
An agent’s doxastic commitments constrain their possible teleological commit-
ments.
8 Note that I gloss over, here and throughout, the difference between doxastic and epistemic modality.
The difference is not of crucial importance to the phenomena that I discuss; if you have a stake in
whether asserting and questioning involve knowledge or just belief (e.g. Williamson 2000), feel free
to replace doxastic with epistemic as you make your way through the main text.
9 For a different implementation, making use of Portner’s (2004) to-do lists, see Farkas (2011).
10 One could imagine an alternative implementation in which the relevant modality is priority modality
of the kind made use of by Portner (2007) and Kaufmann (2012a). I will not attempt here to weigh
the relative merits of such an implementation to the one developed in the main text.
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(35) COMMON GROUND (bifurcated version):
CG = ⟨CGdox;CGtel⟩
WhereCGdox = {p : ∀X ; p ∈DCdox;X},
and CGtel = {p : ∀X ; p ∈DCtel;X}
The Teleological Common Ground (CGtel) is the set of all propositions that all
interlocutors are publicly committed to having an effective preference for.
(36) CONTEXT SET (bifurcated version):
CS = ⟨CSdox;CStel⟩
WhereCSdox = ⋂CGdox,
and CStel = ⋂CGtel ∩CSdox
The Teleological Context Set (CStel) is the set of all worlds compatible with
all the propositions in both Common Grounds. This enforces the realism condition
on effective preferences: the propositions that enter the doxastic Common Ground
constrain which propositions can enter the teleological Common Ground.
(37) THE TABLE (bifurcated version):
T = ⟨Tdox;Ttel⟩
Where the maximal element of Tdox represents the propositions that are cur-
rently candidates for becoming members of CGdox,
and the maximal element of Ttel represents the propositions that are currently
candidates for becoming members of CGtel
The Teleological Table (Ttel) hosts content under consideration for incorpora-
tion intoCGtel . Each Table is associated with its own Projected Set, which contains
possible future Common Grounds incorporating the material on it.
(38) THE PROJECTED SET (bifurcated version):
PS = ⟨PSdox;PStel⟩
Where PSdox = {CGdox+ p : p ∈ MAX(Tdox)},
and PStel = {CGtel + p : p ∈ MAX(Ttel)}
The Teleological Projected Set (PStel) contains a set of possible future CGtels,
one incorporating each element of the MAX(Ttel).
(39) THE QUD (bifurcated version):
QUD = ⟨QUDdox;QUDtel⟩
Where QUDdox and QUDtel are sets of propositions.
QUDtel is a question about what our effective preferences should be. I assume
that QUDtel plays the role Kaufmann (2016) assigns to a contextually salient deci-
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sion problem: imperatives implicitly address a decision problem, just like declar-
atives implicitly address a question about what the world is like. I assume that
QUDtel is constrained by a realism condition as well:11
(40) REALISM CONDITION ON QUDtel:[∀p ∶ p ∈QUDtel]p∩CSdox ≠∅
A decision problem can only be solved by adopting an effective preference for
something that we don’t already know to be impossible.
I assume, following Condoravdi & Lauer (2012; 2017) and Kaufmann (2012a;
2016), that imperatives contain a proposition-denoting sentence radical that is the
argument to a left-peripheral IMP operator. Both authors take that operator to supply
modal semantics. I instead take it to dictate which half of the context that proposi-
tion is used to update; the modality of imperatives comes from the modality of that
half of the context, just as the doxastic interpretation of declaratives comes from the
way assertions interact with the doxastic half of the context.
(41) Let k be the type of a context.
⟦IMP⟧ = l pst :l spe:lck:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
DCtel;sp = DCtel;sp;c+ p
Ttel = Ttel;c + {p}
PStel = {CGtel + p}
c′ = c in all other respects
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
c′
An imperative performs the same context update as an assertion, only with re-
spect to the teleological half of the context.
Finally, following Truckenbrodt (2006) and Rudin (2018), the L* H-H% tune
(steeply, monotonically rising intonation) applies to a function from contexts to
contexts and overrides speaker commitment:
(42) Let K be an abbreviation for type ekk (a function from contexts to contexts).
⟦L* H-H%⟧ = lKK:l spe:lck:[ DCsp = DCsp;cc′ =K(sp;c) in all other respects ]c
′
I assume the following compositional structure:
(43)
L* H-H
IMP CP⋮
11 Cf. Kaufmann (2016) on the ‘choosability’ condition applied to decision problems.
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Schematically, an utterance of a rising imperative carries out the following dis-
course move:
(44) UPDATE WITH A RISING IMPERATIVE
c0;dox
DCsp T DCa
CG0;PS0 = {CG0}
c0;tel
DCsp T DCa
CG0;PS0 = {CG0}
→
c1;dox
DCsp T DCa
CG1;PS1 = {CG1}
c1;tel
DCsp T DCa
{p}
CG1;PS1 = {CG1+ p}
In the teleological half of the context, the utterance raises an Issue containing
the proposition denoted by the imperative’s sentence radical, and the projected set
is altered thereby; the context is otherwise unchanged.
5.3 Rising imperatives: the basic pragmatics
I will now make some Gricean assumptions about the pragmatics of utterances of
imperatives. First, I assume the following generalization of Roberts’s (1996) notion
of the maxim of RELATION:
(45) RELATION:
For any modality a , a discourse move m that places P on Ta is relevant iff
adding an element of P to CGa would (partially) answer QUDa
An utterance of a rising imperative is cooperative only if p could resolve the
contextually salient decision problem.
I will make the following assumptions about the application of the maxims of
QUALITY and QUANTITY as they apply to making teleological commitments:
(46) QUALITY (teleological commitment version):
1) Do not add a proposition to DCtel if it is incompatible with the maximal
elements of your private effective preference structure.
2) Do not add a proposition to DCtel if it is not a maximal element of your
private effective preference structure.
(47) QUANTITY (teleological commitment version):
The more commitments you can make, the better, as long as doing so vio-
lates no other maxims.
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The maxim of QUALITY is a straightforward extension of the maxim as it is
normally applied to doxastic commitments: its first clause enforces that the com-
mitments one makes are not outright incompatible with one’s actual internal state
(here preferences instead of beliefs), and its second clause enforces that the com-
mitments one makes are indeed entailed by it. QUANTITY, as always, says that
more is better, ceteris paribus.
I assume that rising imperatives are in pragmatic competition with falling im-
peratives. As the two constructions differ only with respect to whether the speaker
incurs a teleological commitment to p, on the basis of QUANTITY a falling impera-
tive is always to be preferred to the corresponding rising imperative unless making
that commitment would be uncooperative for other reasons. There is no distinc-
tion between the two constructions with respect to RELATION, as they place the
same content on the Table. So when a speaker utters a rising imperative denoting
p, we can infer that for the speaker to have committed to p would have violated
QUALITY.12
But would the speaker’s commitment to p have violated QUALITY 1 or QUAL-
ITY 2? That is to say, should we infer that the speaker has effective preferences that
are incompatible with p, or simply that the speaker lacks an effective preference for
p at present? The pragmatics of the projected set gives us an answer.
(48) QUALITY (teleological projection version):
1) Do not add a hypothetical Common Ground to the projected set if an
interlocutor has made a public commitment that is incompatible with that
Common Ground (i.e.: don’t project CGtel + p if there is some interlocutor
A such that ⋂DCtel;A ∩ p = ∅)
2) Do not add a hypothetical Common Ground to the projected set if you
have reason to believe there is an interlocutor whose private effective pref-
erences are incompatible with that Common Ground (i.e.: don’t project
CGtel + p if you have reason to believe there is an interlocutor whose pri-
vate effective preferences entail ¬p)
In short, it is not cooperative to project a CG that you have reason to believe
could not actually come about.
Though they make no commitments, the speaker’s utterance leads to a projected
set containingCGtel + p, which is only cooperative if they have no reason to believe
that any interlocutor’s effective preferences are incompatible with p. As they them-
selves are an interlocutor, we can safely infer that their effective preferences are not
incompatible with p, and therefore that for them to have committed to p would’ve
violated only QUALITY 2, not QUALITY 1. In other words, the utterance of a rising
12 I assume here that rising and falling imperatives are equivalently mannerly—neither is obviously
more obscure, ambiguous, prolix, or disorderly than the other.
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imperative is cooperative only if the speaker’s effective preferences neither entail
nor are incompatible with p. This, in addition to the inference that pwould solve the
contextually salient decision problem, comprises the basic pragmatics of utterances
of rising imperatives.
5.4 Accounting for contradictory sequences
As we saw above, sequences of imperatives that are infelicitous with falling into-
nation can become felicitous when accompanied by rising intonation. The relevant
example is repeated here:
(49) A: I’m having trouble managing my time lately. I don’t know what my plans
should be for this evening, do you have any advice?
a. B:Work on your paper? Blow it off and go to the beach?
b. B:Work on your paper. #Blow it off and go to the beach.
The proposal for the discourse effect of falling imperatives correctly predicts
that (49b) will be contradictory. Assume that in the context above Work on your
paper denotes the proposition that the speaker spends her evening working on her
paper, and that Blow it off and go to the beach denotes the proposition that the
speaker doesn’t work on her paper, and goes to the beach instead. These proposi-
tions are obviously disjoint. If the speaker adds two disjoint propositions p and q to
her Teleological Discourse Commitments, then the set of worlds compatible with
all of her teleological commitments (⋂DCtel;sp) will be the empty set; in (49b), the
speaker has made incompatible commitments.
The proposal also correctly predicts that (49a) will be fine: the speaker has made
no commitments of any kind, and therefore cannot have made incompatible ones.
The speaker has communicated that either p or q would resolve the contextually
salient decision problem, and that both are compatible with but not entailed by her
effective preferences.
5.5 Accounting for I insist
As we saw in §2.1, even weak uses of falling imperatives allow the speaker to felic-
itously reply to a negative response with I insist, but such responses are infelicitous
with rising imperatives. I repeat the crucial data here:
(50) Have a cookie. I insist. (51) #Have a cookie? I insist.
I assume that I insist has an elided complement, i.e. that we should read the
above as I insist <that you have a cookie>. I assume that the at-issue content of x
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insist that p is that a relation of insistence holds between x and p (insist′(x; p)), and,
furthermore, that insist′(x; p) asymmetrically entails that x is publicly committed
to p. Finally, I assume that the clause type of the complement of insist determines
what kind of commitment is entailed—if the complement of insist is a subjunctive
clause, then insist′(x; p) asymmetrically entails that p ∈ DCtel;x.13
The infelicity of (51) follows from the pragmatics of rising imperatives. As
discussed above, in order for a rising imperative to be cooperative, it must be unco-
operative for the speaker to commit to p. I insist, however, entails that the speaker
is committed to p. In any situation in which I insist <that you have a cookie> is
felicitous, therefore, Have a cookie? is infelicitous; it is not possible for both utter-
ances to be cooperative relative to the same effective preference structure, as such a
structure would be required to both entail and not entail p. In other words, the infe-
licitous of I insist with rising imperatives follows from the proposed conventional
weakness of rising imperatives: their lack of speaker commitment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve provided a compositional treatment of rising imperatives in terms
of the discourse effect of utterances of imperatives, and the discourse effect of
utterances accompanied by the L* H-H% tune. With respect to the former, I’ve
argued that utterances of imperatives perform much the same discourse move as
that which Farkas & Bruce (2010) define for assertions—where assertions update
a doxastically-interpreted context, imperatives update a teleologically-interpreted
context. With respect to the latter, I’ve adopted Truckenbrodt’s (2006) indepen-
dently motivated proposal that (steeply, monotonically) rising intonation calls off
speaker commitment, and argued that this proposal accounts for the behavior of
rising imperatives.
What results is a worldview in which rising imperatives are conventionally
weak, withholding speaker commitment, and not just pragmatically weak, like ‘of-
fer’ and ‘request’ uses of falling imperatives, in much the same way as rising declar-
atives are conventionally weaker than falling declaratives, irrespective of variation
in the illocutionary interpretation of falling declaratives (see e.g. Gunlogson 2001;
Malamud & Stephenson 2015; Farkas & Roelofsen 2017; Jeong 2018).
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